Inability to access clinical laboratory test results forced hospitals to suspend critical procedures and surgeries causing major disruptions to healthcare
Cyberattacks continue to shut down the ability of hospitals to process orders for clinical laboratory tests, medical imaging, and prescriptions. One such cyberattack recently took place against Ascension, the largest nonprofit Catholic health system in the United States. It took more than a month for the health network’s electronic health record (EHR) system to be fully restored, according to a cybersecurity event press release.
Immediately following the event, Ascension announced it had hired a third party company to resolve the fallout from the cyberattack.
“On Wednesday, May 8, we detected unusual activity on select technology network systems, which we now believe is due to a cybersecurity event. … Access to some systems have been interrupted … We have engaged Mandiant, a third party expert, to assist in the investigation and remediation process, and we have notified the appropriate authorities,” a press release states.
Based in Reston, Va., Mandiant is an American cybersecurity firm and a subsidiary of Google.
Cyberattacks are happening more frequently and medical professionals need to be aware that patient care can be severely disrupted by such attacks. The Ascension attack locked its employees out of the healthcare provider’s computer databases, rendering medical personnel unable to track and coordinate patient care. The health network’s EHR, phones, and databases used to order certain clinical laboratory tests, imaging services, procedures, and medications were all affected.
Hospital employees, including two doctors and a registered nurse, spoke anonymously to the Detroit Free Press regarding the issues at their facilities resulting from the cyberattack.
“It’s so, so dangerous,” said the nurse, describing the immediate aftermath of the cyberattack. “We are waiting four hours for head CT [computed tomography scan] results on somebody having a stroke or a brain bleed. We are just waiting. I don’t know why they haven’t at least paused the ambulances and accepting transfers because we physically … don’t have the capacity to care for them right now.”
“In some cases, what are supposed to be unique medical record numbers assigned to patients when they register in the emergency department at Ascension St. John [Detroit, Mich.] have been given to more than one patient at a time,” Detroit Free Press reported. “Because of that, the nurse told the Free Press she couldn’t be confident that a patient’s blood test results actually were his own.”
“We’ve started to think about these as public health issues and disasters on the scale of earthquakes or hurricanes,” Jeff Tully, MD (above), Associate Clinical Professor, Anesthesiology, and co-director of the Center for Healthcare Cybersecurity at the University of California-San Diego, told NPR. “These types of cybersecurity incidents should be thought of as a matter of when and not if,” he added. Inability to verify clinical laboratory test results or access patients’ electronic medical records endangers patients and undermines the confidence of critical healthcare workers. (Photo copyright: UC San Diego.)
Losing Track of Patients and Their Records
According to the HIPAA Journal’sH1, 2024 Healthcare Data Breach Report, “In H1 [first half of the fiscal year], 2024, 387 data breaches of 500 or more [healthcare] records were reported to OCR, which represents an 8.4% increase from H1, 2023, and a 9.3% increase from H1, 2022.”
After the Ascension cyberattack, the healthcare organization’s computer systems were inoperable, and its pharmacy services were temporarily closed. Medical orders for clinical laboratory testing, imaging tests, and prescriptions had to be handwritten on paper and faxed to appropriate departments, which led to long wait times for patients.
There were cases where singular medical record numbers were assigned to multiple patients. Staff resorted to Google documents, paper charting, and text messaging to communicate with one another. But they still lost track of some patients.
“For a lot of our nurses, they’ve never paper charted at all,” said Connie Smith, a charge capture coordinator and head of the Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals, in a ThinkStack blog post. “We were using forms that we pulled out of drawers that hadn’t seen the light of day in a long, long time.”
“They are texting me to find out where the patient went,” a St. John Hospital Emergency Room physician anonymously told the Free Press immediately following the Ascension cyberattack. “They don’t even know where the patient is going or if they’ve been admitted. People are getting lost.
“The pharmacy is getting requests for patient medications, and they have no idea where the patient is in the hospital,” the doctor continued. “Some of the attending physicians are putting in orders for medications, somewhat dangerous medications, and we have no idea if the medications are actually being administered. It’s a scary thing when your medical license is tied to this. If medication mistakes become lawsuits, they will follow us throughout our entire careers and that is not fair to us. It’s not fair to patients.”
According to online updates provided by Ascension, the cyberattack began when an employee downloaded a malicious file thinking it was a legitimate document. That allowed hackers to access seven of Ascension’s 25,000 servers. The resulting cyberattack stifled operations across the organization’s facilities and among its healthcare providers for weeks.
A June 12 update read, “we are pleased to announce that electronic health record (EHR) access has been restored across our ministries. This means that clinical workflow in our hospitals and clinics will function similarly to the way it did prior to the ransomware attack.” The updates did not mention how the attack was resolved or if a ransom was paid to restore the hospitals’ systems.
Preparing for System Disruptions
According to its website, St. Louis-based Ascension has 134,000 associates, 35,000 affiliated providers, and 140 hospitals serving communities in 18 states and the District of Columbia.
“Despite the challenges posed by the recent ransomware incident, patient safety continues to be our utmost priority. Our dedicated doctors, nurses, and care teams are demonstrating incredible thoughtfulness and resilience as we utilize manual and paper based systems during the ongoing disruption to normal systems,” Ascension noted in a Michigan Cybersecurity Event Update.
Clinical laboratory managers and anatomic pathology practice administrators may want to learn from Ascension’s experience and make advanced preparations that will secure patient information and enable their lab to continue functioning during a cyberattack. The Ascension cyberattack illustrates how easily computer systems containing critical information can be hacked and affect patient care.
Initially thought to be an attack by a nation-state, actual culprit turned out to be a known ransomware group and each day brings new revelations about the cyberattack
Fallout continues from cyberattack on Change Healthcare, the revenue cycle management (RCM) company that is a business unit of Optum, itself a division of UnitedHealth Group. Recent news accounts say providers are losing an estimated $100 million per day because they cannot submit claims to Change Healthcare nor receive reimbursement for these claims.
The cyberattack took place on February 21. The following day, UnitedHealth Group filed a Material Cybersecurity Incidents report (form 8-K) with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in which it stated it had “identified a suspected nation-state associated cybersecurity threat actor [that] had gained access to some of the Change Healthcare information technology systems.”
A few days later the real identity of the threat actor was revealed to be a ransomware group known as “BlackCat” or “ALPHV,” according to Reuters.
Change Healthcare of Nashville, Tenn., is “one of the largest commercial prescription processors in the US,” Healthcare Dive reported, adding that hospitals, pharmacies, and military facilities had difficulty transmitting prescriptions “as a result of the outage.”
Change Healthcare handles about 15 billion payments each year.
According to a Change Healthcare statement, the company “became aware of the outside threat” and “took immediate action to disconnect Change Healthcare’s systems to prevent further impact.”
Change Healthcare has provided a website where parties that have been affected by the cyberattack can find assistance and updated information on Change’s response to the intrusion and theft of its data.
“The fallout is only starting to happen now. It will get worse for consumers,” Andrew Newman (above), founder and Chief Technology Officer, ReasonLabs, told FOX Business, adding, “We know that the likely destination for [the Change Healthcare] data is the Dark Web, where BlackCat will auction it all off to the highest bidder. From there, consumers could expect to suffer from things like identity theft, credit score downgrades, and more.” Clinical laboratories are also targets of cyberattacks due to the large amount of private patient data stored on their laboratory information systems. (Photo copyright: ReasonLabs.)
Millions of Records May be in Wrong Hands
Reuters reported that ALPHV/BlackCat admitted it “stole millions of sensitive records, including medical insurance and health data from the company.”
The ransomware group has been focusing its attacks on healthcare with 70 incidents since December, according to federal agencies.
In a letter to HHS, AHA warned, “Change Healthcare’s downed systems will have an immediate adverse impact on hospital finances. … Their interrupted technology controls providers’ ability to process claims for payment, patient billing, and patient cost estimation services.”
“My understanding is Change/Optum touches almost every hospital in the US in one way or another,” John Riggi, AHA’s National Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk, told Chief Healthcare Executive. “It has sector wide impact in potential risk. So, really, this is an attack on the entire sector.” Riggi spent nearly 30 years with the FBI.
Some physician practices may also have been impacted by the Change Healthcare cyberattack, according to the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA). In a letter to HHS, MGMA described negative changes in processes at doctors’ offices. They include delays in paper and electronic statements “for the duration of the outage.”
In addition, “prescriptions are being called into pharmacies instead of being electronically sent, so patients’ insurance information cannot be verified by pharmacies, and [the patients] are forced to self-pay or go without necessary medication.”
Here are “just a few of the consequences medical groups have felt” since the Change Healthcare cyberattack, according to the MGMA:
Substantial billing and cash flow disruptions, such as a lack of electronic claims processing. Both paper and electronic statements have been delayed. Some groups have been without any outgoing charges or incoming payments for the duration of the outage.
Limited or no electronic remittance advice from health plans. Groups are having to manually pull and post from payer portals.
Prior authorization submissions have been rejected or have not been transmittable at all. This further exacerbates what is routinely ranked the number one regulatory burden by medical groups and jeopardizes patient care.
Groups have been unable to perform eligibility checks for patients.
Many electronic prescriptions have not been transmitted, resulting in call-in prescriptions to pharmacies or paper prescriptions for patients. Subsequently, patients’ insurance information cannot be verified by pharmacies, and they are forced to self-pay or go without necessary medication.
Lack of connectivity to important data infrastructure needed for success in value-based care arrangements, and other health information technology disruptions.
Medical laboratory leaders and pathologists are advised to consult with their colleagues in IT and cybersecurity on how to best prevent ransomware attacks. Labs hold vast amount of private patient information. Recent incidents suggest more steps and strategies may be needed to protect laboratory information systems and patient data.
Sophisticated cyberattacks have already hit hospitals and healthcare networks in Oregon, California, New York, Vermont, and other states
Attention medical laboratory managers and pathology group administrators: It’s time to ramp up your cyberdefenses. The FBI, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint advisory (AA20-302A) warning US hospitals, clinical laboratories, and other healthcare providers to prepare for impending ransomware attacks, in which cybercriminals use malware, known as ransomware, to encrypt files on victims’ computers and demand payment to restore access.
The joint advisory, titled, “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector,” states, “CISA, FBI, and HHS have credible information of an increased and imminent cybercrime threat to US hospitals and healthcare providers.” It includes technical details about the threat—which uses a type of ransomware known as Ryuk—and suggests best practices for preventing and handling attacks.
In his KrebsOnSecurity blog post, titled, “FBI, DHS, HHS Warn of Imminent, Credible Ransomware Threat Against U.S. Hospitals,” former Washington Post reporter, Brian Krebs, wrote, “On Monday, Oct. 26, KrebsOnSecurity began following up on a tip from a reliable source that an aggressive Russian cybercriminal gang known for deploying ransomware was preparing to disrupt information technology systems at hundreds of hospitals, clinics, and medical care facilities across the United States. Today, officials from the FBI and the US Department of Homeland Security hastily assembled a conference call with healthcare industry executives warning about an ‘imminent cybercrime threat to US hospitals and healthcare providers.’”
Krebs went on to reported that the threat is linked to a notorious cybercriminal gang known as UNC1878, which planned to launch the attacks against 400 healthcare facilities.
Clinical Labs, Pathology Groups at Risk Because of the Patient Data They Keep
Hackers initially gain access to organizations’ computer systems through phishing campaigns, in which users receive emails “that contain either links to malicious websites that host the malware or attachments with the malware,” the advisory states. Krebs noted that the attacks are “often unique to each victim, including everything from the Microsoft Windows executable files that get dropped on the infected hosts to the so-called ‘command and control’ servers used to transmit data between and among compromised systems.”
Charles Carmakal, SVP and Chief Technology Officer of cybersecurity firm Mandiant told Reuters, “UNC1878 is one of the most brazen, heartless, and disruptive threat actors I’ve observed over my career,” adding, “Multiple hospitals have already been significantly impacted by Ryuk ransomware and their networks have been taken offline.”
Multiple Healthcare Provider Networks Under Attack
Hospitals in Oregon, California, and New York have already been hit by the attacks, Reuters reported. “We can still watch vitals and getting imaging done, but all results are being communicated via paper only,” a doctor at one facility told Reuters, which reported that “staff could see historic records but not update those files.”
Some of the hospitals that have reportedly experienced cyberattacks include:
In October, the Associated Press (AP) reported that a recent cyberattack disrupted computer systems at six hospitals in the University of Vermont (UVM) Health Network. The FBI would not comment on whether that attack involved ransomware, however, it forced the UVM Medical Center to shut down its computer system and reschedule elective procedures.
Threat intelligence analyst Allan Liska of US cybersecurity firm Recorded Future told Reuters, “This appears to have been a coordinated attack designed to disrupt hospitals specifically all around the country.”
He added, “While multiple ransomware attacks against healthcare providers each week have been commonplace, this is the first time we have seen six hospitals targeted in the same day by the same ransomware actor.”
An earlier ransomware attack in September targeted 250 healthcare facilities operated by Universal Health Services Inc. (UHS). A clinician at one facility reported “a high-anxiety scramble” where “medical staff could not easily see clinical laboratory results, imaging scans, medication lists, and other critical pieces of information doctors rely on to make decisions,” AP reported.
Outside of the US, a similar ransomware attack in October at a hospital in Düsseldorf, Germany, prompted a homicide investigation by German authorities after the death of a patient being transferred to another facility was linked to the attack, the BBC reported.
CISA, FBI, HHS, Advise Against Paying Ransoms
To deal with the ransomware attacks, CISA, FBI, and HHS advise against paying ransoms. “Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered,” the advisory states. “It may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.” The federal agencies advise organizations to take preventive measures and adopt plans for coping with attacks.
The advisory suggests:
Training programs for employees, including raising awareness about ransomware and phishing scams. Organizations should “ensure that employees know who to contact when they see suspicious activity or when they believe they have been a victim of a cyberattack.”
Regular backups of data and software. These should be “maintained offline or in separated networks as many ransomware variants attempt to find and delete any accessible backups.” Personnel should also test the backups.
Continuity plans in case information systems are not accessible. For example, organizations should maintain “hard copies of digital information that would be required for critical patient healthcare.”
“Without planning, provision, and implementation of continuity principles, organizations may be unable to continue operations,” the advisory states. “Evaluating continuity and capability will help identify continuity gaps. Through identifying and addressing these gaps, organizations can establish a viable continuity program that will help keep them functioning during cyberattacks or other emergencies.”
Dark Daily Publisher and Editor-in-Chief, Robert Michel, suggests that clinical laboratories and anatomic pathology groups should have their cyberdefenses assessed by security experts. “This is particularly true because the technologies and methods used by hackers change rapidly,” he said, “and if their laboratory information systems have not been assessed in the past year, then this proactive assessment could be the best insurance against an expensive ransomware attack a lab can purchase.”